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Abstract 
China’s indigenous innovation strategy is a government-led innovation strategy in the term of 
pushing forward the technology development both in the state-owned enterprises and in the 
private enterprises. It was codified in the “Medium- and Long-Term National Science and 
Technology development Plan (2006-2020)” which was officially announced in 2006. 
There are several policy tools as the support to the indigenous innovation strategy. 
 R&D funding 
 Mega projects sponsored by government 
 Public procurement 
 Tax reduction 
 Standards and patents 
Automobile industry is normally regarded as the pillar of the economy as it is both labor intensive 
and capital intensive. It combines a lot of industries like steel industry, chemical industry, 
electronics industry, etc. Before 1980s, Chinese automobile industry concentrated on the 
commercial vehicle manufacture. Since 1980 the government started to be aware of the 
passenger car industry. Because of shortage of capital and technology, joint-venture was 
regarded as the only choice to get a rapid development for the passenger car industry at the cost 
of opening the market to the foreign automobile enterprises. This is a case of the famous 
“exchange market for technology” strategy, which is generally regarded as an aborted strategy 30 
years later even though the Chinese government never officially acknowledges. In the beginning 
of 2000s, more than half of the Chinese passenger car market was occupied by the China-made 
foreign brand cars. Before the year of 2000, there are two types of automobile manufactures in 
China, one is state-owned enterprises, the other is the joint-ventures set up by the state-owned 
enterprises and their foreign partners most of which were the top automobile enterprises in the 
world like Volkswagen, GM, Toyota, etc. From 2000, the private capital was permitted to enter 
the automobile industry and became the third type of automobile enterprises in China. 
Not only in automobile industry, but also in many other industries, the failure of the “exchange 
market for technology” happened. Even more is that the advantage of low labor cost is losing 
under the competition from the emerging countries like India, Vietnam, etc. The Chinese 
government has the willing to turn from “world factory” to an innovation-driven country for the 
economic development in the future. The indigenous innovation strategy is put forward to try to 
solve those problems. 
After the indigenous innovation strategy being push forward, the new innovation system is 
emerging. This thesis is to research on the change of the innovation behavior both in industry 
level and enterprise level under the impact of the indigenous innovation strategy. 
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1: Introduction 
As After almost 30 years’ high speedy development, China has become the second largest economy in 
the world, China is emerging to the center of the world's economic stage. This emergence has been 
accompanied by constant changes in its legal and economic sectors. The innovation sector also has 
witnessed numerous recent changes. There have been significant new advances in China's national 
innovation policies. ‘indigenous innovation’ is a national strategy put forward by the PRC government 
for the purpose of promoting the development of technological innovation in domestic companies, it 
is a policy concept that the PRC government developed to boost the creation and commercialization 
of proprietary ideas and technologies by Chinese companies, eventually leading to the ownership of 
their own core IP rights. It has been a core component of China's economic development policy for 
several years. 
1.1 China’s indigenous innovation strategy 
Innovation is the process of discovering new ideas and realizing those ideas at large scale, changing 
the ways people live and work. In the industrial countries, innovation is regarded as the catalyst to 
the economic growth. Normally the innovation behavior is led by the market demand in the 
developed countries in which the free market plays the role of “invisible hand” which was defined by 
Adam Smith. In developed countries, the governments do not directly get involved in the economy 
activities. The enterprises fund the research in the purpose of technology development. The market 
competition stimulates the enterprises to produce goods with higher quality but lower price as the 
same as more new functions. Innovation is the only way to solve the problem. The government 
normally uses the tool of the public procurement to guide some research area like aerospace, military, 
etc. But the government does not have enough power to change the trend of the innovation of the 
industries. 
There is no universally shared view on the proper role of government in innovation systems. In China, 
the government still plays an important role in directing national innovation systems. Since the 
Chinese economy transferred from central planning to the market economy, the government is 
gradually reducing the direct intervention to the economy activities, but it still play a decisive role. It 
is the same in the respect of the innovation. The major elements of the old national innovation 
system are comprised by the central government, the state-owned enterprises, Universities and 
government-led research institutes. A number of government agencies, notably the Ministry of 
Commerce, MOF, MII, MOST and NDRC, have significantly influenced science and technology and 
innovation policies and implementation. Other agencies also have somehow indirect influences. 
There are two reasons for maintaining strong government involvement in innovation. First is Chinese 
enterprises remain weak in developing commercially successful innovations and the Chinese 
government maintains the power to mobilize national resources for the development of key 
technologies such as high-speed railway, nuclear, aerospace, etc. 
Since China’s Reform and Open policy, Chinese economy got a rapid development with the 
advantages of low cost labor and materials. Lots of multinational companies build factories in China, 
so China has long been labeled with the moniker 'The World's Factory'. But at the same time, Chinese 
enterprises are primarily engaged in low added-value, environmentally-unfriendly manufacturing, 
with the more complex aspects of product research, design, and development often being dominated 
by foreign entities. Under this condition, the central leadership has become increasingly aware of the 
necessity to transform China’s economic model from a manufacturing-based to a service and 
IP-based one, so as to mitigate the social problems and to secure China’s competitive position in 
international trade.  
In 2004, the 
indigenous innovation 
was placed on the 
agenda of national 
policy as its 
importance was 
mentioned by the 
Chinese government. 
In October 2005, the 
Central Committee of 
the CPC passed the 
“Proposal for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan of National Economic and Social Development (2005–2010),” 
stressing that indigenous innovation will be pursued through the “formation of internationally 
competitive enterprises which own independent IP rights and well-known trademarks. It is 
developmentally risky to have foreign-owned patents underlie much of China's economic growth and 
to allow foreign brands to dominate the marketplace. The new ‘indigenous innovation’ policy was 
proposed under this kind of background. 
Fig. 1 can explain what the Chinese Central-government planners were concerned about. According 
to the ‘Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006’ which is regard as the authoritative report of 
global competitiveness published by World Economic Forum, the China’s competitiveness rank 
located at the 54th position among 125 countries all over the world, which totally doesn’t match the 
position as the fourth largest economy of the world (According to 2005 GDP Ranking of World Bank). 
‘Indigenous innovation’ strategy is not a single policy or strategy; it is combined by a series of national 
policies and guidelines 
in the technological 
innovation sector. At 
the center of China's 
‘indigenous innovation’ 
strategy is the 
“Medium- and 
Long-Term National 
Plan for Science and 
Technology 
Development 
(2006-2020)” (MLP) and a follow-up document on its supporting policies both announced by the 
State Council in 2006. The concept of ‘indigenous innovation’ was introduced into China's national 
industrial policy and laid out several goals— chiefly, to develop a system to evaluate and qualify 
‘indigenous innovation’ products, establish a system to use government funds to buy such products, 
and give them preferential treatment in the government procurement process. The plan encouraged 
government agencies to work cooperatively to develop measures that would favor products that use 
 
Fig. 1 – Global GDP Ranking and Annual GDP Value of China 
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Fig. 2 –China’s Global Competitiveness Index 
Data from Global Competitiveness Report published by World Economic Forum 
39 38 
44 46 48 
53 
63 65 62 64 
30
40
50
60
70
30
40
50
60
70
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GCI Ranking Technology Index
Chinese-developed ideas and technology. Since then, several central- and local-government agencies 
have implemented preferential policies, product catalogues, financing schemes, and other tools to 
ensure that the ‘indigenous innovation’ strategy results in the development of Chinese-owned 
technology and intellectual property (IP). 
 The plan targets 11 key sectors for employing technology development and innovation to solve 
China’s problems. They include energy, water and mineral resources, environment, agriculture, 
manufacturing, transportation, information and services, population and health, urbanization, 
public security and national defense. Within these sectors, there are 68 priority areas that have 
clearly defined missions and expectations of technology breakthroughs. 
 It also earmarks eight fields of technology in which 27 breakthrough technologies are to be 
pursued. These include biotech, information technology, advanced materials, advanced 
manufacturing, advanced energy technology, marine technology, laser technology and 
aerospace technology. 
 There are four basic research programs highlighted: protein science, nanotechnology, quantum 
physics and developmental and reproductive science. These research programs are aimed at 
exploring 18 basic scientific issues and hundreds of listed subsets ranging from the “dialogue 
between the human brain and computers” to “supersonic propulsion systems and super 
high-speed collisions” to the “evolution of black holes and diverse celestial bodies” to “biological 
processes within the earth’s system” and “the role of the central nervous system, immune 
system and endocrine system in health and major disease”. 
 The MLP aims to solve China’s energy natural resource shortage through coal liquefaction and 
gasification, renewable energy development, exploration and extraction technology and power 
grid efficiency. 
 Water shortages are to be fixed through desalination and efficient distribution systems. Dozens 
of pollution control objectives are aimed at cleaning up China’s horrific pollution through 
environmentally friendly fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides and waste recycling. 
 Building a modern dairy industry and creating genetically modified crops are two leading aims 
for solving the country’s food safety and limited arable land problems. 
 High speed rail and electric automobile technology are priorities as are next generation internet 
and supercomputers, stem cell based tissue engineering, energy efficient buildings, disease 
prevention, manufacturing robotics, deep sea exploration expertise, fast neutron nuclear 
technology and drugs and reproductive health products “to ensure that the country’s population 
is below 1.5 billion and the birth defect rate is below 3 percent”. 
 The goal is to increase China’s gross expenditure on R&D to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2020 from 1.3 
percent in 2006, with a target of basic research reaching 15 percent of R&D spending by 2020. 
 The plan called for China’s overall reliance on foreign technology to “decline below 30 percent” 
from an estimated 60 percent in 2006. 
 The MLP also directed that the number of patents and leading academic papers from Chinese 
nationals will rank among the top five in the world by 2020. 
In February 2006, the State Council issued both "The Guiding Principles of Program for Mid-to-Long 
Term Scientific and Technological Development (2006-2020)" and a notification about a number of 
accompanying policies on the implementation of the above program, requiring that 'improving 
‘indigenous innovation’' be made the most important aspect of all science and technology related 
work and that the promotion of ‘indigenous innovation’ be carried out through tax incentives, 
financial support and technological investment and so on. 
The MLP blueprint is full of grand visions and good intentions about international cooperation and 
friendship. It calls for fostering open-minded scientists who take risks and work in collaboration with 
the best scientists across the globe. It encourages Chinese enterprises to establish overseas research 
and development centers. It calls for “establishing the nation’s credibility and image in international 
cooperation” and “to perfect the nation’s intellectual property rights system.” It also sets goals for 
expanded cooperation with foreign universities, research centers and corporate R&D centers. 
In September 2006 the Chinese tax bureau “Circular on Preferential Tax Policies for Innovation 
Enterprises” offered two year exemption of enterprise income tax. 
In December, 2006 the “Administrative Measures on the Accreditation of National ‘indigenous 
innovation’ Products” was released collaborated by the Ministry of Science and Technology (“MOST”), 
the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) and the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) , it 
outlined the plans for creating national ‘indigenous innovation’ product catalogues to accelerate the 
‘indigenous innovation’ through government procurement. The 'Accompanying Measures' stipulate 
that correlating government departments must both set up systems for the authentication of new 
‘indigenous innovation’ products and create a list of these products. Those products listed will be 
treated preferentially during government procurement. Under the 2006 Accreditation Measures, in 
order to qualify for an indigenous innovation product accreditation, applying enterprises must have 
Chinese legal person status.  
In December 2006, the Ministry of Science and Technology, National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance issued "Methods for Determining the National ‘indigenous 
innovation’ Products (Trial)" stipulating the norms and procedures by which ‘indigenous innovation’ 
products can be recognized. In order to be recognized as ‘indigenous innovation’ product, a product 
must fulfill the following conditions: 
 The product meets the requirements set forth by China’s laws and regulations and complies with 
national industrial and technology policies. 
 The product has been produced by an enterprise that has full ownership of IP rights in China via 
its own technological innovation activities; or the Chinese enterprise, work unit, or citizen has, 
by legal means, obtained the Chinese IP rights or usage rights. 
 The product has an independent trademark, i.e., the applying entity has ownership of the 
registered trademark.  
 The product embodies a high degree of creativity and innovation. In doing so, the product either 
demonstrates a mastery of core production technology; or has substantively improved upon the 
original product in terms of its structure, quality, material, and craftsmanship, and demonstrates 
a clear improvement in product performance; or has become the domestic or international 
technical standard in the industry. 
 The product’s technology is advanced, and has reached the advanced international level among 
similar products. 
 The product’s quality is deemed reliable through certification from the China National 
Certification Administration or its provincial department branches. Products that belong to 
industries that have special administration requirements must have their product licenses 
approved and issued by the relevant departments of the State Council. Products that belong to 
China’s compulsory product certification regime must have the certification. 
 The product has already entered the stream of commerce, or has potential economic benefits 
and promising market prospects, or can substitute importation. 
The May 2007 “Measures for Administration of Government Procurement Budgets for ‘indigenous 
innovation’ Products” suggested government at all levels to develop specific ‘indigenous innovation’ 
procurement plans or they would lose procurement funds. In the same month, “Measures for 
Assessment of Government Procurement of ‘indigenous innovation’ Products” lowered government 
procurement supplier qualification standards for companies doing ‘indigenous innovation’. 
In December 2007, the guideline of “Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of 
Imported Products” which gave the guideline that the central and local government and the related 
agencies needed to acquire the approval to purchase imported goods was issued by MOF. A strong 
purpose of the guideline is to encourage the foreign suppliers with technology transfers and training 
services. 
In January 2008 “Enterprise Income Tax Law” offered a preferential rate of 15 percent to high-tech 
enterprises designated by the government as ‘indigenous innovation’ companies because they 
developed and owned their intellectual property. 
In November 2009, "2009 Explanatory Report Regarding the National ‘indigenous innovation’ 
Products" was drafted and issued according to the "Methods for Determining the National 
‘indigenous innovation’ Products (Trial)” jointly by MOF, NDRC and MOST. Six high-tech industries 
were identified for inclusion in the ‘indigenous innovation’ catalogue, namely computers, 
telecommunication installations, modern office equipment, software, new energy, and energy saving 
products. In other words, only the products of above listed high-tech industries are involved in the 
question of the preferential treatment of the products of ‘indigenous innovation’ by government 
procurers. 
In order to implement this policy, several central government agencies cooperated to develop 
measures that provide preferential treatment to accredited ‘indigenous innovation’ products in 
government procurement. The related PRC government agencies are responsible for developing and 
implementing ‘indigenous innovation’ policies. Here introduce the major actors of PRC government 
managing ‘indigenous innovation’ 
 The State Council Leading Group on Science, Technology, and Education  
 MOST – Ministry of Science and Technology 
 NDRC - National Development and Reform Commission of PRC 
 MOF - Ministry of Finance of PRC 
 MIIT - Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of PRC 
1.2 China’s automobile industry 
To research on the indigenous, the Chinese automobile industry is an ideal sample. The reason is the 
Chinese automotive industry has been the largest in the world measured by automobile unit 
production since 2008. Since 2009 annual production of automobiles in China exceeds that of the 
European Union or that of the Unites States and Japan combined. But half century before no one 
could draw a map like this as in 1950 there was almost no automobile industry in China. If review the 
he development of the China’s automobile industry from 1950 to 2010, it can easily be divided by 
three stages.  
It has been observed that the Chinese automobile industry has demonstrated a generally rising trend 
in the period of 1958 to present. What can be drawn out from the preceding analysis firstly is that the 
development of the Chinese automobile industry is different from that in other Asian countries as 
well as that in the West. Another distinctive picture of the Chinese automobile industry is that the 
Chinese government has played a dominant role in the development of the Chinese automobile 
industry. The Chinese government has intervened in one way or another in the development of the 
Chinese automobile industry. The strong government involvement in the development of the Chinese 
automobile industry is not a unique story. In the case of China, the nature and process of the 
government involvement in the development of the Chinese automobile industry has changed 
dramatically. While the government involvement featured direct control at the beginning stage, it 
then changed to guiding intervention. As seen in the previous discussion, the development of the 
Chinese automobile industry used to be handled by the centralized decisions of the Chinese 
government at the beginning stage. Then these decisions were left to automobile customers and 
manufacturers coordinated primarily at the market place. Although the direct control has been 
abandoned, the Chinese government involvement still plays a very important role in influencing the 
development of the Chinese automobile industry. The automobile firms would have difficulties in 
doing business in China without taking into account the political factors. 
Here we only discuss the vehicle manufacturers excluding parts and components companies. Let’s see 
what has happened in the past two years in China’s automobile industrial. As we know now, in 2009 
China took USA’s place and became the biggest automobile market of the world. In 2010, China still 
kept this position. As a prediction, in 2011 this situation will be continued. According to the 
information published by Bureau of Statistics of China, from January to August, the total production 
amount (includes passenger car and commercial vehicle) in China is 12,3 million, at the same time the 
total vehicle production in USA is 5.58 million , in Japan it is 4.92 million in the same period (data 
from Japanese Automobile Manufacturer Association). China has already been the most productive 
nation of automobiles all over the world. 
It can easily classify the Chinese automobile manufacturers into three types, one type is state owned 
automobile manufacture company, the second type is joint-venture automobile manufacture 
company, and the third type is local brand automobile manufacture company. The state owned 
automobile manufacture companies like FAW, SAIC, etc. are the main power and pillar of China’s 
automobile industry. The joint-venture automobile companies have special position in China’s 
automobile industry. These joint-ventures are set up by Chinese state owned automobile 
manufacture companies and global leading automobile manufacture companies. They have played a 
very important role in the process of modernization of China’s automobile industry. The foreigner 
partners bring advanced vehicle models; product lines and modern management into China’s 
automobile industry, at the same time grasp huge profit from China’s automobile market. These 
joint-ventures also enjoy the preferential tax policies and other preferential conditions supplied by 
Chinese government. The local brand companies survive in the gap left by the state owned 
companies and the joint-ventures. Most of them started from manufacturing and providing low 
priced cars, they grasped the opportunity of the boom of private passenger cars consumption and 
grew up.  
To classify the China’s automobile market is almost the same with to classify the Chinese automobile 
manufacture company. The high-end passenger car market share is occupied by imported cars from 
the global leading brand like Royce-Rolls, BMW, Mercedes, etc. The production of high-end market 
share provides high performance, luxury interior trim, high-tech electronic device and enjoyable 
environment. Behind all of these is the development of high-edge technology which the joint-venture 
automobile companies and independently owned companies can’t provide. The largest part of the 
middle-end market share is occupied by joint-ventures. The independently owned companies take 
the biggest share of the low-end market. According to the market trend this structure of market share 
is changing slowly. The threshold of the high-end market is too high for the joint-ventures and 
independently owned companies to enter. But in the middle-end market and the low-end market, the 
joint-ventures and the independently owned companies start to compete in both two market levels. 
The joint-ventures create new brand to enter the low-end market in order to enlarge the market 
share. The independent owned companies start the brand strategy and bring different brands aim at 
different market segments. 
The main state owned automobile manufacture companies: 
SAIC Motor Corporation Limited is the biggest automobile manufacture company in China after it 
merged Nanjing Automotive (Group) Corporation in the year of 2007. Till end of 2009 SAIC Motor has 
totally 125,991 staffs (includes 34,005 from joint-ventures), of which are 16,929 technical engineers 
and 14,029 are R&D staffs. In the year of 2009, SAIC Motor manufactured totally 2,76 million vehicles, 
of which are 1,53 million passenger cars.  
First Automobile Works has the longest history in automobile manufacture area. At the end of 2009, 
FAW has totally 102,947 staffs (incl. 29,064 from joint-ventures), of which there are 13,654 technical 
engineers and 3,967 R&D staffs. In the year of 2009 FAW totally manufactured 1.94 million vehicles, 
of which are 1.62 million passenger cars. 
 
2009 Gross 
Output Value 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total 
Assets 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total staff 
Technical 
engineers 
R&D 
staffs 
2009 
Production 
Volume 
(million) 
Passenger 
Car 
Volume 
(million 
SAIC 283,05  131,49 125,991 16,926 14,069 2,76 1,53 
Table 1-The economic indicators of SAIC 
Data from Chinese automobile industry yearly book 
 
Dongfeng Motor Corporation is currently in the top 4 along with Chang'an Motors, FAW Group, and 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation. As well as buses, trucks, and cars sold eponymously at 
home and abroad, it also manufactures parts. Dongfeng is the Chinese partner in many joint ventures 
with foreign companies. As of 2011 it has more Sino-foreign joint-ventures than any other Chinese 
automobile manufacturer. In 2009, the company sold 1.9 million units, making it the second 
most-productive Chinese vehicle-maker. It reported 1.4 million sales of passenger vehicles that same 
year.  
Chana automobile is an automobile manufacturer in Chongqing, China, and a state-owned enterprise 
with China Weaponry Equipment as parent. Its production is primarily composed of no frills 
passenger cars and mini-vehicles, micro vans and micro trucks that for commercial use. Also known 
as Chana, the company is currently one of the "top 4" Chinese automakers along with Dongfeng 
Motor, FAW Group, and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation. In 2009 it became the fourth 
most-productive automobile manufacturer in the Chinese automobile industry by selling 1.36 million 
units–a little more than 10% market share. 
Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co Ltd is a holding company of several Chinese automobile and 
machine manufacturers, such as Beijing Automobile Works Co Ltd, etc. Beijing Automotive Industry 
Holding Co Ltd (BAIC)'s state-run parents may include Beijing Automotive Group (BAIC Group), and 
the Beijing State-owned Assets Management Co. This can explain why BAIC companies are sometimes 
 
2009 Gross 
Output Value 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total 
Assets 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total staff 
Technical 
engineers 
R&D 
staffs 
2009 
Production 
Volume 
(million) 
Passenger 
Car 
Volume 
(million 
FAW 300,5 131,5 102947 13654 3976 1,94 1,62 
Table 2-The economic indicators of FAW 
Data from Chinese automobile industry yearly book 
 
 
2009 Gross 
Output Value 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total 
Assets 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total staff 
Technical 
engineers 
R&D 
staffs 
2009 
Production 
Volume 
(million) 
Passenger 
Car 
Volume 
(million) 
Dongfeng 265.7 242.5 143792 13418 9465 1,91 1,44 
Table 3-The economic indicators of Dongfeng 
Data from Chinese automobile industry yearly book 
 
 
2009 Gross 
Output Value 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total 
Assets 
(billion)  
RMB 
Total staff 
Technical 
engineers 
R&D 
staffs 
2009 
Production 
Volume 
(million) 
Passenger 
Car 
Volume 
(million) 
BAIC 109 59.4 46208 - - 1.27 1.24 
Table 4-The economic indicators of BAIC 
Data from Chinese automobile industry yearly book 
 
referred to collectively as the Beijing Automotive Group. Commonly known by the name Beiqi or the 
acronym BAIC, it is thought of as the fifth-largest domestic Chinese automaker. Beiqi was one of the 
top ten most-productive Chinese automakers in 2009. This may be due to subsidiary Beijing 
Automobile Works and a sustained surge of popularity for Beijing Hyundai products. It reached fifth 
place by selling nearly 1.25 million units garnering a market share of more than 9%. 
1.2.1 The establishing of China’s automobile industry 
The first stage was from 1950 to 1980. In this stage, a significant feature was the automobile industry 
focused on the commercial vehicle as the country needed rapidly developed the industry. The 
initiation of the establishment of the Chinese automobile industry dates back to March 1950, when 
the national meeting was held in order to set up the automobile industry in China. During the 
primitive period, the youthful Chinese automobile industry was beset with technical and economic 
difficulties. The qualified technicians and well-trained working forces, for instance, were scarce at the 
time. Infrastructure barriers, too, exerted a retarding influence on the early development of the 
Chinese automobile industry. Another barrier to the early development of the Chinese automobile 
industry was the insufficiency of capital. In such a situation in which the Chinese automobile industry 
could hardly find a way of self-development, foreign aid from the Soviet Union played an important 
role in establishing the automobile industry in China. The Soviet Union also helped China established 
a number of large-scale modern firms and trained plenty of young technicians. 
Besides the foreign aid underlying the huge economic supports of the Soviet Union, the Chinese 
government launched a nation-wide campaign to encourage the early development of the 
automobile industry. The Chinese government also undertook a series of measures to encourage the 
early development of the automobile industry as a part of its First Five-Year Plan from 1953 to 1957. 
More important is that Chinese automobile workers devoted all their efforts to their tasks in 
establishing the automobile industry. They endured low wages, hardworking surroundings, and so 
forth. This fact indicates a clue to explain why the Chinese automobile industry was brought into 
being rapidly. For China during the 1950s, the dominant characteristics of the formation of the 
Chinese automobile industry were direct government investment and control. More specifically, the 
Chinese government invested RMB Yuan 6,600 million in establishing the automobile industry during 
this period. In 1953, China started to build its first modern automobile factory -- The First Automotive 
Works (FAW) in Changchun City, Jilin Province. Three years later, the construction of FAW was 
completed. The FAW was established with a planned productivity of 300,000 vehicles. On July 13th, 
1954, the FAW manufactured the first 4-ton truck in China – Jiefang Truck which was based on the 
type of GAZ 57 (a product of GAZ automobile factory which was the state-owned automobile 
manufacturer of the Soviet Union in 1950s).  
From 1950 to 1977, as for the formation of the Chinese automobile industry at this stage, the whole 
series of events was not possible without the state’s direct control from the utilization of the 
economic aid of the Soviet Union, to the nation-wide campaign to encourage the development of the 
automobile industry. The Chinese automobile industry was confined almost exclusively to internal 
development at the time. China’s isolated position at the time made the circumstances surrounding 
the development of the automobile industry even worse. In contrast, the manufacture of automobile 
flourished in other Asian countries at the same time. Besides the South Korean automobile industry, 
the Japanese automobile manufacturing profited not only by the early shift to the economical car 
production but also by the well-trained employees, the continuous technical innovation, and the 
global vision. In 1965, cars occupied only 37.1% of the total motor-vehicle output in Japan while 
trucks occupied 61.9%. Ten years later, cars occupied 65.8% of the total motor-vehicle output in 
Japan while trucks declined to 33.7%. 
1.2.2 The growth of China’s automobile industry from 1978 to 2000 
Beside the macroeconomic adjustment and control conducted by Chinese government at the 
beginning of 1990s, China’s automobile industry has been keeping a continuing growth in the stage of 
past 30 years. Now the year 1978 is regarded as the beginning of a new stage, because in this year 
the Chinese government officially announced the Reform and Opening policy and made it as a basic 
national policy for at least 50 years. This policy brought a fresh air to the China’s rigid economic. The 
Reform & Open policy left tremendous consequences on the Chinese society from economy to 
ideology. 
To the China’s automobile industry, the Reform and Opening policy brought not only a big chance, but 
also a big challenge which maybe the biggest one China’s automobile industrial had ever met. In this 
condition, China’s automobile market would start to open to the whole world, the global leading 
automobile manufacturers were coming and would bring advanced technology and management into 
China, and how to prevent China’s national automobile industrial from being destroyed was a big 
question in front of China’s automobile industry. At that moment China’s automobile industry in 
particular for passenger car manufacture was still in the way of half-handmade even though the 
automatic assembly line already had been created by Henry Ford sixty years ago.  
In the year before 1980, for ordinary Chinese people a private passenger car is like Arabian nights. On 
one side Chinese government did not encourage private car consumption, on the other side even 
someone had enough money to afford a car, there was nowhere for him to buy a car, because all the 
production was produced and delivered according to a so called plan. Under the framework of 
planned economy China’s automobile manufacturers only needed to product according to the plan 
which was made last year or even more years ago, as the supply chain was also planned in the same 
way. So the China’s automobile manufacturers did not need to consider the customers and suppliers. 
Everything was planned, although this kind of plan was always disturbed by reasons.  
In the years after 1981, since China’s Reform and Open policy had started to execute, along with the 
introduction of market mechanism into the Chinese economy, China’s automobile industry started to 
change and develop because there would no longer be a plan. China’s automobile manufacturers 
realized that if they were to survive in a market-oriented economy they would have to develop new 
technology and product well-designed products for the new coming private firms and individuals. The 
Chinese government decided to reform the automobile industry; as a result, China Automotive 
Industry Company was established in May 1982. China Automotive Industry Company had 7 
subsidiaries included six automobile manufacturers and one components and parts manufacturer.  
These changes were the signal that the Chinese government began to change the form of central 
control to local decision in order to stimulate China’s automobile industry and encourage the local 
area automobile manufacture and consumption in China. As the response to the change, lots of 
automobile companies were set up consequently. The Chinese government started to treat the 
automobile industry as a crucial industry to stimulate the development.  
At that moment, all of the automobile manufacturers were state owned. After the gate of China 
re-opened to the whole world, it was easily to find out the discouraged fact that China’s automobile 
industry had at least 20 years’ lag both in technology and in management compared with western 
countries. To catch up seemed an impossible mission because of several reasons. The first one is as 
the automobile industry was a capital-intensive industry; the Chinese economic foundation was too 
weak to support such huge investment. The second one is that the technological lag was so huge to 
step over. So the Chinese government decided to find some kind of external power to solve these 
problems. After several times’ contacted with the international leading automobile companies, the 
Chinese government accepted the principle of joint-venture. 
In the year of 1983, Beijing Automobile Works (BAW) and the USA automobile manufacturer AMC 
(acquired by Chrysler in 1987) signed on the “Operation agreement” and “Joint-venture contract”, the 
first automobile joint-venture of China was set up in Beijing, the capital of China. According to this 
contract BAW held 68.65% share of the joint-venture, AMC held 31.35% (After 1987 is Chrysler). The 
main production of the joint-venture was off-road car-the Jeep serial. In October of 1984, a symbolic 
event of China’s automobile industry happened in Shanghai, Germen automobile manufacturer 
Volkswagen and Shanghai Automobile Industry Corporation (SAIC) signed the contract to establish 
the first passenger car joint-venture-Shanghai Volkswagen (SVW). This event now is regarded as the 
start of China’s automobile industry modernization. In SVW, SAIC held 50% share, Volkswagen Group 
held 40% and Volkswagen (China) Investment Corporation held 10%. That means in SVW, Chinese 
partner and Germen partner each own 50% of shareholding. This kind of shareholding ratio almost 
became a fixed model to the joint-ventures till now. In the following years, Chinese government 
officially issued several guidelines on joint-venture automobile companies; a very important one is in 
the joint-venture the shareholding ratio of Chinese partner could not lower than 50%. 
During this stage, China’s automobile industry got a rapid growth. There were two reasons to explain 
the great leap forward. First is the market need of the automobile products was stimulated by the 
development of China’s economy as the result of the “Open and Reform” policy 
1.2.3 The rapid development of China’s automobile industry in the first decade of 21st century  
The year of 2000 was regarded as the beginning of 21st century, in October of this year the tenth 
Five-year Plan was discussed and passed. The most important clause listed in the plan for China’s 
automobile industry was that the Chinese government encouraged private car consumption. Also in 
the same year, the president of Germany said in an interview that every germen family should have at 
least one car; it sounded like a dream far way for Chinese people to image a car for each family at 
that moment. But nobody even included the professional consulting companies and institutes like 
McKinsey could have predicted that ten years later the dream is coming true. 
The year of 2001 was the most important year since the Reform and Open policy was announced. 
China became the member of World Trade Organization so called WTO. It was also so important to 
China’s automobile industry, China’s becoming the member of WTO brought a huge chance and also 
risks to China’s automobile industry. The huge chance was that China’s automobile industry had the 
chance to take part in the global market; more and more giant automobile manufacturers would 
come and bring the new technology and industrial management to China. The risk meant China’s 
automobile industry would have the danger to lose its independent position. Even more was that 
according to the agreement signed by China and WTO the tariff of vehicle production would be 
reduced from 80% in 2001 to 25% in 2006. As the price of imported vehicle would be cut down, the 
price and profit space for China’s independent brands would be compressed year by year. But for 
Chinese customers the reduction of vehicle import tariff was absolutely good news, the sale market 
started to accelerate from then on. 
In the year of 2002, the output of China’s automobile industry reached 3 million, and also the vehicle 
sale volume reached 3 million which seemed to be a response to the reduction of vehicle import tariff. 
In the same year State Development and Reform Commission of China began to draw up the new 
China’s automobile industry policy as the old one which was published in 1994 could not suit the 
development of China’s automobile industry. 
After 2 years discussion and preparation, on 1st of June, 2004 State Development and Reform 
Commission of China published the new policies of China’s automobile industry. Compared to the old 
version published 10 year ago, the New Policy includes both more restrictive and more liberal clauses. 
Some of important differences of the new version were: 
The Policies called for a reform of the Chinese automobile industry by the year 2010 in order to 
create large companies that can compete on the international market. As part of this reform, car and 
motorcycle manufacturing enterprises were encouraged to develop international cooperation and 
large enterprise groups were encouraged to associate or merge with international automobile 
groups. 
 The new Policies encouraged the innovation of China’s automobile industry. 
 The new Policies encouraged the automobile manufactures to develop production with 
independent intellectual property rights. 
 The new Policies required domestic and foreign automobile manufactures to establish a car 
brand sales and service system as soon as possible. This system could be set up by the 
manufacturer directly or by car distributors appointed by it. 
 The new Policies encouraged the automobile manufacturers to develop cleaner technologies and 
new fuel car in order to reduce the vehicle emission.  
 The Policies also addressed various issues aimed at developing a consumer-led automotive 
market that includes (new and used) car retailing, servicing, financing and related activities. 
1.2.4 Statistic view of China’s automobile industry 
Of the automobiles produced, 44.3% were local brands (including BYD, Lifan, Chang'an (Chana), Geely, 
Chery, Hafei, Jianghuai 
(JAC), Great Wall and 
Roewe), and the rest 
were produced by joint 
ventures with foreign 
car makers such as 
Volkswagen, General 
Motors, Hyundai, 
Nissan, Honda, Toyota, 
Mitsubishi etc. While 
most of the cars 
manufactured in China 
are sold within China, exports reached 814,300 units in 2011. China's home market provides its 
automakers a solid base and Chinese economic planners hope to build globally-competitive auto 
companies. 
The chart shows the vehicle production volume of China’s automobile industry from 2000 to 2010. In 
these ten years, the vehicle production volume increased rapidly at a sharp rate from 2 million in the 
year of 2000 to 18.3 million in the year of 2010, more than six times. The boom of the passenger cars 
consumption devoted a large part of the increase. Benefit from the increase of Chinese consumers’ 
incoming, the passenger car production got a rapid increase from 2000 to 2010, the passenger car 
production volume of 2010 was almost thirteen times of that in 2000. Because of the development of 
China’s economic and Chinese government’s keeping investing on the infrastructure, the production 
of the commercial vehicle and buses also increased quickly from 2000 to 2010. 
Except the year of 2005, the vehicle import volume of China from 2000 to 2009 increased quickly. In 
2000, this number was 
42.7 thousand units, 
but in the year of 2009, 
the vehicle import 
volume climbed to 
813.4 thousand units, 
almost twenty time of 
the number in 2000.  
In 2009, there were 
totally 420.7 thousand 
vehicle were imported 
to China, of which 
were 49.29% of SUV, 
39.18 of sedans and 8.48% of MPVs, the trucks and buses take a very small share as showed in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 3- Gross Output Value of China's automotive industry in GDP Proportion 
Data from Chinese automobile industry yearly book 
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Fig. 4 –Vehicle production of China from 2000 to 2010 
Data from Chinese automobile industry yearly book 
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The Fig.5 shows from 2000 to 2002, the vehicle export kept an inactive situation. From 2003 to 2008, 
with the increase of the vehicles produced by the independently owned automobile manufacturers, 
the vehicle export volume got a rapid raise. In the year of 2009, under the impact of the global 
financial crisis, the vehicle export volume declined almost 50% compared to the year of 2008. In the 
year of 2010, with the recovery of the economies from the financial crisis, Chinese vehicle export 
acquired a 53% raise compared to the year of 2009, but the total vehicle export volume of 566.7 
thousand vehicles was still less than 2008 of 681 thousand vehicles. 
As the competition intensifies in China’s automobile market, more domestic manufacturers have 
shifted their focus to foreign countries. To gain more access to the overseas market, China’s auto 
makers have begun to launch factories abroad. As showed in table 2.6, the most vehicle export 
destinations still 
concentrate to Africa 
and middle-east 
countries except 
Germany. It will still 
be a long time in the 
future for the 
Chinese automobile 
manufacturers to 
export vehicle to U.S. 
and Europe. 
In 2011, the total vehicle production volume of China’s automotive industry reaches 184.1 million, 
still keeps the first position of the rank of global vehicle production and takes 23 percent share of 
global vehicle production. But compared to the year of 2010, there is only a 0.84 percent increase; 
the growth rate is the lowest in the past thirteen years. Of these, the production volume of passenger 
vehicles is 14.5 
million, a 4.23 
percent increase 
compared to last year; 
the production 
volume of 
commercial vehicles 
is 3.9 million, a 9.94 
percent decline 
compared to the year 
of 2010. The main 
reasons why the 
growth rate of the production volume in 2011 got a remarkable decline is the cancellation of the 
Vehicle Purchase Tax Subsidy from 1st, Jan, 2011, which was as part of the China Autos Stimulus 
Package originally announced in Jan. 2009 by the State Council.  
 
Fig. 5 –Vehicle import volume from 2000 to 2010 
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Fig. 6 –Vehicle export volume from 2000 to 2010 
Data from Chinese automobile industry yearly book 
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2: Literature review 
China’s Indigenous innovation strategy causes extensive attention from domestic and abroad, 
especially in USA, Germany and Japan. A lot of papers or articles were published in analyzing the 
motivation for Chinese government to put forward the indigenous innovation strategy.  
In ‘China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous Innovation Policies, and Frameworks for 
Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy’ published by U.S. International Trade Commission 
discussed the link between the indigenous innovation strategy and the intellectual property 
infringement, and the impact of the indigenous innovation strategy on the economy of USA. 
McGregor (2010) conducted a study of China’s indigenous innovation strategy in which the 
indigenous innovation strategy was described as a web of policies in which the foreign companies are 
trapped. The study came out the pessimistic result that the technology advantage of the foreign 
companies will be weaken under the impact of the indigenous innovation strategy. In the study the 
indigenous innovation strategy is regarded as the second act of ‘Open and Reform’ policy which 
shows the ambition of Chinese government to change the reputation of made in China to innovated 
in China. On one side it pointed out the awkward situation the foreign companies faced that the 
foreign companies don’t want to give up their dominant position of advanced technology innovation 
in the mean while they also can’t ignore the potential of Chinese market. On the other side it worried 
about China’s lax enforcement of IPR protection.  
Most of the researches discussed on the macro economy level, at most reached the industry level 
without paying much attention on the firms. For the automobile industry of China, there isn’t any 
research of the innovation strategy under the impact of the indigenous innovation strategy 
particularly. This thesis 
3: The new innovation system of China is emerging under the impact of the indigenous innovation 
strategy 
In 2006, the State Council of China announced “Medium- and Long-Term National Plan for Science 
and Technology Development (2006-20)” (MLP) and a follow-up document on its supporting policies. 
The indigenous 
innovation strategy 
is a combination of 
a series of policies 
and guidelines.  
The implement of 
the indigenous 
innovation strategy 
can be roughly regarded as series of policy tools. These policies were launched by several 
departments/bureaus of the central government like Ministry of Science and Technology of the 
People’s Republic of China (MOST), National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s 
Republic of China (NDRC) and Ministry of Finance of People’s Republic of China (MOF), etc.  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
National R&D Funding 
(Billions,USD) 
12.6 15.56 18.6 23.7 30.1 38.5 50.8 66.2 
R&D funding/GDP 0.95% 1.07% 1.13% 1.23% 1.34% 1.42% 1.52% 1.70% 
Annual growth ratio to 
last year  
23.5% 19.5% 27.4% 27.0% 27.9% 31.9% 30.3% 30.8% 
Table 5 – National R&D Funding, 2001-2008. 
The direct tool is the R&D funding by which China expects to upgrade its innovation capability. The 
way to fund the R&D is to provide research projects. MOST is in charge of the projects management. 
It chooses the topic in related area like industry, transportation, medical, agriculture, aviation, etc. All 
the Chinese domestic 
enterprises in related 
area have the 
qualification to apply 
for the projects. Their 
application will be 
examined by MOST in 
order to identify if the 
technology capability 
of the enterprise can 
satisfy the requirement 
of the project. But an indisputable fact is that the state-owned enterprises are easier to pass the 
examination. 
Table 5 demonstrates that the central government is increasing funding for R&D, significantly after 
2005. Beside the projects, MOST also has a series of long-term R&D programs. Each of these 
programs has a 
major topic 
which focuses 
on some certain 
research area.  
Fig 7 shows that 
China focus 
funding on 
more 
experimental 
development 
than on applied research and basic research. China still under invests in basic research, despite more 
than six years of implementing its national indigenous innovation strategy. A nation’s basic research 
relies heavily on government research and development funding. 
Table 6 gives an overview of the 
major program led by MOST. 
Among these 
science-and-technology 
programs the national high-tech 
program (short for “863” 
program) which was launched in 
March, 1986, has been the 
priority. It is focusing on the 
specific goal of bringing Chinese 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
"973" Basic Research 71.2  82.8  96.6  108.3  121.8  173.6  225.5  275.4  
Key technologies R&D program 127.2  161.6  162.5  195.0  201.3  384.6  745.4  734.8  
"863" High-tec program 301.9  305.9  1147.8  1122.3  1409.6  - - - 
National key laboratories 
program 15.7  15.7  15.7  1.6  16.6  27.7  21.9  23.3  
Innovation fund for SMEs 94.6  65.2  99.9  99.9  122.5  108.1  172.1  211.6  
Table 6 – National Science and Technology Program Funding, 2001-2008. 
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Fig. 7 – Annual Funding of Basic and Applied Research and Experimental Development of 
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high technology up to contemporary global standards. 
After a series of the policy tools used, the new innovation system is emerging. The patent application 
is commonly regarded as an indicator to measure the innovation performance. Fig.8 shows the 
growth of the volume of the patent applications in China from 2002 to 2009. After the year of 2005, it 
appears a significant acceleration as the response to the Chinese indigenous innovation strategy. 
4: The response of the automobile industry to the indigenous innovation strategy 
In the automobile industry, according to the capital property the automobile enterprises can be 
divided into three types. The SOEs are the state-owned automobile enterprises. The non-SOEs means 
the automobile enterprises are funded by Chinese domestic capital which is not owned by the state. 
The foreign-funded enterprises means the automobile enterprises are funded by foreign capitals 
including joint-ventures (including the capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau). The vehicle 
productions produced and sold in China under the foreign brand are normally regarded to devote to 
the output value of the foreign-funded enterprises. 
As showed in Fig. 9, since 2003 the total output value of three type’s enterprises of automobile 
industry got a significant increase benefited from the strong market demand. However each 
ownership type has progressed different rate. Not only are non-SOEs clearly progressing at the 
highest rate, they also boast a 2007 total industrial output value of US$69.6 billion. Foreign-invested 
enterprises produced a total of US$68.9 billion in 2007. In 2007 state-owned enterprises fell to third 
place with a total output value of US$38.2 billion. 
For the innovation system of the 
enterprises, the R&D employees are 
the main innovating actors. To keep 
such employees, enterprises must 
both pay them well and provide them 
with high-quality research and 
development infrastructures. 
Whether or not an enterprise is 
innovative largely depends on the 
number and the quality of the 
inventors employed. In China usually 
only large SOEs have historically been 
able to maintain a large number of scientists and engineers as employees. However Figure 10 
indicates a clear trend: between 2002 and 2007 the absolute number of scientists and engineers 
working in SOEs declined. 
The scientists and engineers working in SOEs declined significantly from 13.2 thousand in 2003 to 
12.7 thousand in 2008. The number of scientists and engineers which are hired by non-SOEs and 
foreign-funded enterprises increased between 2003 and 2008. 
 
Fig. 9 – Total output value of China’s automobile industry (Millions USD). 
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While SOEs have continued to receive strong support from the central government their human 
resources devoted to research and development appear to have been declining since before 2005. In 
the mean while non-SOEs and foreign-funded enterprises have steadily increased their research and 
development employees. This trend indicates that a redistribution of innovation resources is 
beginning to emerge in China and that the earlier pre-2006 innovation policy so favorable for SOEs is 
no longer significantly detrimental to the innovation efforts of non-SOEs. 
Patent application volume is a significant indicator of the innovation performance. Fig.10 shows the 
patent application volume of the top four automobile enterprises (according to the vehicle 
production volume) of each type of 
SOEs, Non SOEs and Joint-ventures. It 
shows clearly that from 2003 to 2005, 
the patent application volume 
increased very slowly. After 2005, the 
patent application volume of each 
type got a rapid raise. The patent 
applications of non-SOEs increased 
significantly faster than the other two 
types of automobile enterprises. Of 
the three types, the patent 
applications of the SOEs increased most slowly. 
5: The response of the automobile enterprises to the indigenous innovation strategy 
The state owned automobile enterprises are placed high hopes to take the responsibility of 
technology innovation in China’s automobile industry which was considered as the main purpose of 
the ‘exchange market for technology’ policy. After almost two decades from 1980 to 2000, the policy 
can hardly be regarded as successful for the technology innovation of the Chinese automobile 
industry. The result of the implementation of the ‘exchange market for technology’ policy can be 
divided into two parts – the successful part and the failed part which means the result didn’t match 
the original purpose of the policy, the success part of the policy was the foreign automobile 
enterprises acquired the market via sale the cars under the foreign car brands that the cars were 
manufacture in China and import from abroad; the foreign automobile enterprises built the whole 
supply chain in China and introduced the modern management system to the Chinese automobile 
industry, the failed part was for the state-owned automobile enterprises that the innovation ability 
didn’t developed well as it was designed by the policy. The technology innovation of the state-owned 
companies still depends on their foreign partners. From 2001 to 2005, the patent applications of the 
state-owned automobile enterprises are less than 100 pieces per year which doesn’t match the 
leading position in the Chinese automobile industry.  
 
Fig. 10 – Number of R&D employees, 2003-2008 
0
10000
20000
30000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
SOEs Non-SOEs Foreign
From 2006, under the force of the implementation of a series of the indigenous innovation policies by 
the Chinese government that the self-owned IPR was considered as one of the main indicators of the 
indigenous innovation, the state-owned companies started to turn from depending on foreign 
partners to indigenous innovation. The IPR strategy was also paid more attention. It shows that from 
2006, the volume 
of patent 
application of the 
four state-owned 
companies which 
are chosen as the 
samples got the 
obvious raise.  
After 2006, the 
four state-owned 
automobile 
enterprises all 
began to build self-own brands and to develop self-innovation strategy. SAIC acquired the IPR of 
Rover’s 75, 45 and 25 car types in 2006 and developed its own-brands ‘Roewe’ and car type Roewe 
750, 550, 350 based on Rover’s car types. In the same year of 2006, FAW announced its self-own car 
brand – ‘Besturn’. The first car type of Besturn was based on Mazda 6 that FAW was permitted to 
utilize all the IPR. In 2007 Changan set up its oversea R&D centers in Turin, Italy and Yokohama, Japan, 
etc. In the respect of the patent application volume, the state-owned automobile enterprises don’t 
perform as well 
as its increase of 
production 
volume.  
For the foreign 
automobile 
enterprises, all 
the patent 
applications filed 
in SIPO have the 
priority in other patent office like USPO, JPO and EPO. To apply the patent in China is in the purpose 
of achieving the IPR protection in China. The IPR strategy of the foreign companies in China can be 
regarded as a part of their global IPR strategy. In the whole period from 2001 to 2006, the yearly 
patent application of foreign automobile enterprises kept stable in general.  
From 2006 to 2008, it appears a tardo raise of the patent application. A curve appears in 2008, under 
the impact of the global financial crisis, the patent application declined. 
  In the respect of the patent application volume, Toyota is the activist as its performance in world 
wide. It can be concluded that the indigenous innovation strategy almost has no obvious impact on 
the IPR strategy of the foreign automobile enterprises. 
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Fig. 12 –Yearly patent application volumes of the foreign automobile enterprises 
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The automobile joint-ventures have the special position in China’s automobile industry as they were 
set up together by the state-owned companies and the foreign companies. On one side, the 
automobile joint-ventures enjoy the policy support from the state-owned companies which are 
directly 
supported by the 
Chinese 
government. On 
the other side, 
the 
joint-ventures 
obtain the capital 
and technology 
support from the 
foreign 
automobile enterprises. As the joint-ventures manufacture and sale the car products under the 
brands of the foreign companies, the technology innovation of the joint-ventures normally is 
dominated by the foreign companies which is the common cooperate mode in the joint0ventures. A 
obvious result of the cooperate mode is that the IPR strategy of the joint-ventures in China is the 
least active.  
As is showed in the chart above, from 2001 to 2006, the joint-ventures almost had no patent 
applications in China. There is a big change from the year of 2006. After the indigenous innovation 
strategy was announced around 2006, the innovation strategy of the joint-ventures started to turn to 
local innovation that means the joint-ventures gradually put more innovating power in China to 
realize the domestic innovation strategy in order to , on one side follow the indigenous innovation 
strategy policy; on the other side, reduce the cost of innovation. A noticeable issue is the high-edge 
technology innovation like powertrain and transmission is still kept in the home countries of the 
foreign automobile enterprises. The technology innovation in China mainly focuses on the 
re-engineering, adjusting and non-core techniques.  
In general the patent 
application volume of 
the joint ventures is 
the least in 
comparison with the 
state-owned 
companies and the 
non-state-owned 
companies. The 
highlight is PATAC. 
PATAC is the 
automobile technology companies set up by GM and SAIC in Shanghai in 1997. It is a design and 
engineering center and is involved in engineering for GM products, including the GM Theta platform 
and Saturn Vue. By 2011, it has over 2000 salary employees. Originally PATAC is set up as the 
engineering and design department of Shanghai-GM in charge of reengineering the involved GM car 
 
Fig. 13 –Yearly patent application volumes of the joint-ventures 
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Fig. 14 –Yearly patent application volumes of the joint-ventures 
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type in order to fit the Chinese automobile market. With the development of PATAC, it became an 
independent limited company and started to plan its innovation strategy. From 2006, its technology 
accumulation gave it a rich payback in the respect of IPR.  
The non-state-owned automobile enterprises can be regarded as the most active in the respect of 
technology innovation as they are the weakest power in comparison with the state-owned companies 
and the joint-ventures in the Chinese automobile industry. The non-state-owned automobile 
enterprises can neither obtain the support direct from Chinese government as much as the 
state-owned automobile enterprises, nor the non-state-owned companies have enough capital and 
technology compared with the automobile joint-ventures. Most of the non-state-owned automobile 
enterprises started their car business around the year of 2000 when the policy limitation of private 
capital in automobile industry was removed.  
For the non-state-owned automobile enterprises, the technology innovation is most important to 
stand in the market competing with the state owned companies and their joint-ventures. The period 
from 2001 to 2005 can be regarded as the period of technology accumulation for the 
non-state-owned 
automobile 
enterprises. The 
process of the 
innovation strategy of 
the non-state-owned 
companies in general 
can be concluded as 
‘imitation – 
reengineering – 
innovation’ which is 
similar to the 
development process of Japanese automobile industry in the 1970s. Normally the non-state-owned 
companies started with imitating some mature car types in order to reduce the development cost 
and time. From the process of the reengineering the non-state-owned companies obtain the 
accumulation of the technology. Innovation can be regarded as the result of the technology 
accumulation. For the non-state-owned companies, to get the whole IPR there are several ways, the 
first is self-innovation which is slow but solid, the second way is consigned R&D and the third is 
cooperation with universities or research institutes domestic or abroad. From 2006, it shows an 
obvious raise of the patent applications of the non-state-owned companies. It can be concluded as 
the innovation strategy of the non-state-owned companies already changed from ‘learn from others’ 
to ‘innovate by self’. 
In comparison with the state-owned automobile enterprises and the joint-ventures, the 
non-state-owned companies were the smallest in scale and power, but the most patent applications. 
Especially after the indigenous innovation strategy was implemented, the IPR strategy of the 
non-state-owned companies changed from active to aggressive.  
 
Fig. 15 –Yearly patent application volumes of thee non-state-owned enterprises 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Geely 0 0 0 0 5 58 119 212 779 1562
BYD 0 12 23 151 444 1063 1356 1598 1195 1253
Great Wall 0 0 0 0 0 19 10 32 122 585
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6: Case study of BYD  
BYD is a Chinese manufacturer of automobiles and rechargeable batteries based in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong province of China. Hailed for its innovations, BYD has grown to become a major 
manufacturer of rechargeable batteries, most notably mobile phone batteries. BYD topped the 2010 
Bloomberg Business week Tech 100 list, a list of large, fast-growing tech companies. 
BYD started its business with the rechargeable batteries in 1995 and tapped into the automobile 
industry in 2002 by the acquisition of Tsingchuan Automobile Co., Ltd which was renamed as BYD 
Automobile Co., Ltd in 2003. After BYD entered in the automobile industry, BYD formed its special 
innovation strategy. Especially as BYD has the IT business and the rechargeable battery business, BYD 
has the natural advantage in the development of New Energy Vehicle (NEV) industry as showed in the 
chart below. 
BYD’’s innovation system can be divided to three levels. These three levels of R&D departments 
constitute BYD’s innovation network. If described to the human body, the three levels can be apart 
described to the brain, the torso and the limbs.  
The Central Research Institute is the planner of BYD’s innovation strategy in middle – long term. It is 
in charge of developing technical 
reserves for the future 
development. The main 
responsibility of the Central 
Research Institute was listed 
below.  
 Foundation theory research in 
the relevant areas like 
automobile, IT and battery 
 Collect, analyzing, research 
and absorb the patent information in relevant areas 
 Cross-sectorial integration 
 Supply theoretical support to the second level 
The second level is made up by fifteen R&D institutes in respective area corresponding to different 
manufacturing departments. These R&D institutes are divided to two segments – the automobile 
segments and the battery segments. The main function of the battery R&D department is in charge of 
the applied research in the direction planned by the central research institute. The automobile R&D 
department in Shanghai is in charge of the automobile engineering development and test.  
 
Fig. 16 –BYD’s vertical integration strategy 
Beside the three-level R&D structure, a very important department is the patenting affair department. 
The patenting affair department 
isn’t a law-related department but 
a patent information support 
center which provides the patent 
information to the R&D 
department to evade the patent 
barriers. In the meanwhile, it is in 
charge of patenting affaires to 
manage BYD’s patent portfolios. 
Along with the other innovation 
methodologies is BYD’s IPR 
strategy as BYD is a technology 
based company. In 2003 it helped BYD to win the litigation by Sony in Japan. On 7th, August, 2003, 
without any pre-negotiation, Sony sued BYD with infringing one of its Li-ion battery patents – the 
No.2646657 patent in Tokyo 
District Court in Japan, Sony 
requested to forbid BYD exporting 
Li-ion battery to Japan. BYD’s 
patent department cooperated 
with R&D departments and law 
affair department to reply to the 
charge that BYD didn’t infringe 
Sony’s No.2646657 patent at all. 
On 8th, October, 2003, after the 
court debate, Tokyo District Court 
pronounced the judgment that BYD didn’t infringe Sony’s patent. After won the litigation, the patent 
department made a report to the board that the Sony’s No.2646657 patent should not be valid. In 
March of 2004, BYD applied to JPO (Japan Patent Office) to declare the No.2646657 patent invalid. In 
January of 2005, JPO declared the No.2646657 patent invalid. Sony appealed in the Intellectual 
Property High Court (A special 
branch of Tokyo High Court) to 
rescind the declaration of JPO. In 
November, 2005, the Intellectual 
Property High Court overruled the 
claim of SONY. In December, 2005, 
SONY revoked all the claims to 
BYD from Tokyo District Court.  
The period from 1995 to 2000 is 
the period for BYD to accumulate 
its technology power and to form 
its IPR strategy. The period is the process of BYD to recharge its accumulation of technology. From 
2001 to 2006, BYD’s IPR strategy started to be implemented that the volume of the yearly patent 
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Fig. 17 –BYD’s new innovation system after 2006 
 
Fig. 18 –BYD’s patent application volume from 2001 to 2010 
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Fig. 19 –BYD’s patent applications separated in different types 
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application raised slowly but unfalteringly.  
From 2006 to 2008, BYD’s patent applications got a quick growth. The main reason is after entered 
the automobile industry, BYD paid the great attention on it along with BYD’s high efficient R&D 
structure and its IPR management. The other reason is BYD’s development of the new energy 
industry and NEV. As the new energy industry and NEV are regarded as the green technology of the 
future, BYD put a great power on it in order to occupy a leading position in the competition of the 
future. 
The patent application volume can only describe that BYD is a patenting practitioner; it can’t give the 
detailed information about the ingredients of BYD’s patent applications. As the patent can be divided 
into three types - invention, utility model and design, the patenting behavior in different type may 
help us to address BYD’s patenting strategy. Invention is regarded novel and inventive and has a 
protection period of 20 years. The number of the inventions can obviously indicate the innovative 
ability the enterprise has. As is showed in the following chart, the inventions takes forty-four percent 
of total patent applications which means BYD puts a great attention on its core technology 
development. The utility model takes forty-six percent of total patent applications almost the same 
percentage as the inventions. In 
comparison to invention, utility 
model is less inventive. The utility 
model is mainly concerned to the 
development of existing 
technology or process. The utility 
model normally can be directly 
used in the new product 
development. BYD also focuses on 
the products improvement and 
new product development. The 
design takes only ten percent of 
total patent applications. BYD’s innovation strategy can be concluded as innovating for future, 
changing for today.  
As China is BYD’s main market, most of BYD’s 
patent applications concentrated in China which 
takes eighty-six percent share of total 
applications. BYD also has developed an 
international patent strategy as now BYD’s 
rechargeable battery business is running in 
many foreign countries, and also the 
automobile business in the future. As showed in 
the following chart, BYD’s patent applications 
filed by WIPO are 332 pieces, filed by EPO are 
373 pieces. USPTO has filed 315 pieces which is 
the most among the single country patent 
offices. Korea Patent Office has filed 128 pieces. 
 
Fig. 20 –BYD’s patent application filed in different countries and regions s 
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IPC Sub class Volume Percentage of total 
H01M 1664 19.1% 
H05K 344 4.0% 
G06F 254 2.9% 
B60K 232 2.7% 
G02F 222 2.6% 
G01R 202 2.3% 
H04M 201 2.3% 
H02J 195 2.2% 
H01L 190 2.2% 
B60R 137 1.6% 
Table 7 –Top 10 IPC Subclasses of BYD’s patent applications 
It indicates that BYD’s main markets abroad concentrates in USA and European countries as the 
cellphone markets in these countries are large. Korea, which is the big consumer electronics 
manufacturer, is also the big market for BYD. 
If classified by IPC Subclass, BYD’s patent applications can be classified by more than 700 IPC 
subclasses. The patent applications of the top ten IPC subclasses in total make approximately 42% 
share of all the applications of which the IPC subclass H01M takes the biggest share of 19.1%. H01M 
is defined as “Processes or means, e.g. batteries, for the direct conversion of chemical energy into 
electrical energy”. It shows that BYD has a big patent portfolio in rechargeable battery sector which is 
an important factor of BYD’s future developing in the NEV industry. 
7: An empirical research on the joint-venture indigenous innovation 
The so called “joint-venture indigenous innovation” means the joint-venture automobile enterprises 
of China create new brands and secondary-innovate based on the technology platform purchased or 
transferred from the foreign partners of the joint-ventures. The intellectual property rights (including 
the brands) of the secondary-innovation belong to the joint-ventures, the double sides of the 
joint-ventures share the IPRs. It is a new model of the innovation in China’s automobile industry and 
different with the innovation model of the independent brands and the joint-ventures. Normally, the 
innovation model of the automobile joint-ventures is the foreign partners provide car types and 
related technologies except core technologies; the Chinese partners (most of them are the 
state-owned automobile enterprises) cooperate on the localization development in order the 
introduced car type to fit the needs of Chinese consumers well. But before the joint-venture 
indigenous innovation, all the products of the joint-ventures are sold under the brand of the foreign 
partners. Now all the profits of the new brands created by the joint-ventures belong to the 
joint-ventures.  
The first step was taken 
by Guangzhou-Honda, in 
2007 Guangzhou-Honda 
announced the new brand 
“Everus”, the concept of 
the joint-venture 
indigenous brand was the 
first time shown to the 
public. In Feb, 2011 the 
first car type of “Everus” – 
S1 came off the product 
line. The S1 was based on 
the Honda’s car type – Fit. 
In a short word, the 
Everus S1 was a Honda Fit 
but under the different 
brand. After Everus, the SAIC GM Wuling (joint-venture of SAIC, GM and Wuling) released the new 
The joint venture Brand Car Type Time on market 
SAIC-GM Wuling Baojun 630 August,2011 
GAC Honda Everus S1 April,2011 
Dongfen-Nissan Venucia D50 April,2012 
Dongfen-Honda CIIMO CIIMO April,2013 
Bejing Hyundai Shouwang SW1 2014 
Dongfeng Yueda KIA Dianyue D1 Unknown 
FAW-Volkswagen Kaili Unknown Unknown 
Shanghai Volkswagen Tantus E-lavida Unknown 
Chanan Mazda   C401 Unknown 
Chanan Ford   New car type from Ford Unknown 
GAC Toyota   A new electrical car Unknown 
FAW-Toyota   Luxury Car Unknown 
Brilliance BMW   New Energy Vehicle Nov,2013 
Table 8 – Number of R&D employees, 2003-2008 
brand “BAOJUN” (meaning "treasured horse"), Dongfeng – Honda released the new brand “CIIMO”, 
etc.  
The reason for the joint ventures to perform the indigenous innovation strategy 
 To evade the limit of the indigenous innovation strategy in order to take part in the public 
procurement.  
The release of the indigenous brands by the automobile joint-ventures is the result of China’s 
indigenous innovation strategy. In 2009 “Plan on Adjusting and Revitalizing the Auto Industry” 
was announced by the State Council of China in which the indigenous innovation, cooperation 
with foreign enterprises, acquisition and merging domestic and abroad were supported to 
develop the indigenous brand. Especially, the indigenous brand was defined by the “Plan on 
Adjusting and Revitalizing the Auto Industry”.  
 The trademarks of the indigenous brands should be registered in China by the automobile 
enterprises in China (including the joint-ventures). 
 The trademarks should be owned exclusively by the automobile enterprises in China 
(including the joint-ventures) all over the world. 
 The automobile enterprises in China (including the joint-ventures) should own the 
intellectual property rights, the industrial property and the rights to transfer the technology. 
 The trademarks should be obviously marked on the vehicle products. 
The joint-venture indigenous brand could fulfil all the above rules. That is the direct reason for 
the automobile joint-ventures to develop indigenous brands. 
 To avoid the limitation of the government to the joint-ventures.  
The huge market needs stimulates the foreign automobile enterprises to develop in China. But to 
satisfy the market needs, the joint-ventures have to build more factories in China, there are a lot 
of limitations from the government to the joint-ventures. From 2010, the Chinese government 
set a series of the thresholds to limit the expansion of the joint-ventures. To own the intellectual 
property rights and the plan of developing New Energy Vehicles became the important 
conditions for the joint-ventures to obtain the admission to build new factories. A lot of the 
joint-venture indigenous brands were set to fulfil the rules, so the first car types of those 
indigenous brands were New Energy Vehicles. The indigenous brand “Tantus” of 
Shanghai-Volkswagen, the indigenous brand “Shouwang” of Beijing-Hyundai were released 
under this condition. 
 To compete with the indigenous brands of the Chinese automobile enterprises. 
Beside to fulfil the policies, another reason is to occupy the low price level market. Before 2006, 
the Chinese automobile market was a three level structure according to the price. The imported 
vehicle occupied the high level. The vehicle products of the joint-ventures occupied the middle 
level. The domestic brands (including the brands of the state-owned enterprises and the 
independently owned enterprises) occupied the low level market. The products of the 
joint-ventures were sold under the trademark of the foreign brands, so these products had to 
keep the price strategy identical with the global market. But now with the creation of the new 
indigenous brand, the joint-ventures can compete with the Chinese domestic brands in the 
low-price level market.  
8: Conclusion 
It has passed six years since the indigenous innovation strategy was announced in 2006. As is showed 
in the results, the implementation of the indigenous innovation strategy has different impact on the 
different type of the automobile enterprises in China. The state-owned automobile enterprises have 
the longest history, the largest scale and the strongest support from the Chinese government. But 
from the beginning the 1980s the huge technology and management gap in comparison with the 
foreign automobile enterprises made them to cooperate with the foreign companies in order to 
obtain the rapid development. In the process of cooperation with the foreign partners the 
The factors The reason Category 
The automobile policies set the limittation Fulfil he policy 
The drive 
force of the 
innovation 
The Chinese consumer needs the new brand and new car types The demand of the market 
If not perform the indigenous innovation the joint venture always is 
only the factory while the foreign partner controls the technology 
The blockade of the 
technology 
The joint-venture has the technology base to develop on The technology condition 
The joint-venture can have double brands to compete on the market The strategy of the brand The strategy 
factor To occupy the low price level market segment The market segments 
The indigenous brand belongs to the joint-venture, the partners of 
double sides share the property according to their shareholdings of 
the joint-venture 
Intellectual property rights The 
indigenous 
innovation 
mode 
The R&D is led by the research insititute of the joint-ventures. The R&D teams 
The decision-making authority belongs to the joint-venture, not to 
either side of the partners of the joint-venture 
The decision-making 
authority of the R&D 
Based on the existing car type of the joint-ventures sourced from the 
foreign partner 
The product source 
The 
technology 
support from 
the foreign 
partner of the 
joint venture 
The core-compoments are supplied by the suppliers of the 
joint-ventures 
The supply chain 
The foreign partner provide the technology data Technology source 
The engineers of the foreign partner support the development Technology support 
The engineers of the Chinese partner take part in the whole process 
of the development 
Technology absorb 
Technology 
transfer The key part of the development is to train the R&D team of the 
joint venture 
Training 
The joint venture set the R&D institute to perform R&D Set R&D institutes 
R&D 
investment 
Table 9 –The factors for the joint-ventures to develop the indigenous brands 
state-owned automobile enterprises gradually lost the self-innovation ability as the technology could 
be involved by the foreign partners. The situation was changed since the indigenous innovation 
strategy was announced. The state-owned started to develop self-innovation ability via different 
ways like IPR transfer, co-innovation with foreign companies and setting up oversea R&D centers, 
etc.  
The indigenous innovation strategy has little direct impact on the innovation strategy of the foreign 
companies as the technology centers normally are in their home countries. As a part of the foreign 
companies, the joint-ventures didn’t have the clear IPR strategy before the indigenous innovation 
strategy was announced as the joint-ventures originally was defined as the manufacturing bases of 
the foreign companies. But after 2006 under the pressure of the indigenous innovation strategy, the 
joint-ventures started to turn from the manufacturing base to the innovative manufacturing base 
which means the joint-ventures try to obtain the ability of innovation to get the better opportunity in 
the Chinese automobile market as they are more close to the Chinese market than their foreign 
owners.  
Although the non-state-owned automobile enterprises entered in the automobile industry almost 20 
years late than the state-owned companies and the automobile joint ventures, the non-state-owned 
companies stand on the giant’s shoulder as the state-owned companies and their joint-ventures has 
already build up the whole supply chain of the automobile industry. The non-state-owned 
automobile enterprises normally have the clear innovation strategy and IPR strategy and they are 
also policy intensive. The indigenous innovation strategy gives the non-state-owned companies a 
strong stimulation in the technology innovation as they always active in innovation and the IPR 
protection. 
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